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In this article our purpose is to investigate how Eurosceptic online public opinion differs in 
Sweden and Denmark and to provide an explanation for this phenomenon. We are also 
interested in the form of this difference: its tone (how the Eurosceptic messages are 
formulated/expressed) and its content (what the major critiques against the EU contain). 
The theoretical contribution we want to make is to employ political culture as a way to explain 
variation in the way different European publics critically discuss the EU. Rephrasing the 
popular question about culture’s applicability to politics, we ask: ‘Can cultural variations 
among countries account for differences in political orientations towards European integration, 
as well as the public attitudes towards the resulting social and material outcomes of those 
orientations?’ We operationalize this general question by looking concretely at instances of 
negative orientations of political parties, media and the national publics of Denmark and 
Sweden towards European integration. Our working hypothesis is that we are to expect a 
difference between the two cases, and that the difference is due to the contrast between the 
Swedish and Danish political cultures. Our empirical material comes from online political 
discussion forums dealing with EU questions. We expect that the tone of the Danish 
Eurosceptic voices will be more radical than that of the Swedish EU critics, a divergence we 
attribute to differences in normative codes of conduct brokered within the framework of the 
two national political cultures. We also expect that the content of the Swedish debate will be 
more inclined towards utilitarian reasons in comparison with the Danish case, where affective 
factors will be more predominant. 
Our contribution to the study of Euroscepticism is twofold. Firstly, we want to emphasize the 
need to observe the variance in anti-EU voices and analyze this pan-European phenomenon in 
its various national contexts. Much research on Euroscepticism has focused on the analysis of 
statistical large-N studies producing generalizable results. We argue in favor of a re-
contextualization of these results and posit that there is not ONE Euroscepticism but many. We 
want to emphasize that one of the most significant factors in producing differences in the tone 
and content of Eurosceptic orientations is political culture. 
Secondly, we contribute to the scholarship on Euroscepticism by bringing into empirical focus 
an understudied arena for debating Europe, namely online debate forums. We find these virtual 
loci of interaction highly relevant to the study of public opinion towards the EU, as they do not 
bind political discussions to explicit political membership, ideologies, or specific media 
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channels that may be biased on account of economic or other special interests. Due to the 
anonymity of the participants and the lack of a priori categorization into political cliques, 
online debate forums are easily accessible, promote a feeling of subjective empowerment, and 
can therefore be considered as examples of civic engagement. 
The structure of our paper is as follows: we begin by discussing our theoretical framework and 
its relationship to the existing scholarship on Euroscepticism and its drivers at the national 
level.  We then make an argument why the comparison between Sweden and Denmark is both 
interesting and legitimate, followed by a brief overview of the two countries’ political 
communication cultures. In the methodology section we detail the steps to assess the tone and 
content of Swedish and Danish online posts according to a matrix of expectations we 
constructed along three categories: Tone, Type, and Reason. After a systematic comparison of 
1785 posts, we present and interpret the results and thereafter, draw some more general 
conclusions that could guide further research in the field. 
Theoretical framework 
The main contention put forth in our theoretical framework is that variations in Euroscepticism 
can be explained by differences in political cultures. Political culture, as a way of 
conceptualizing the relationship between culture and politics, suggests that cultural norms 
affect domestic political decisions as well as the public’s attitudes towards the social and 
material outcomes of those decisions.  While acknowledging the pitfalls of cultural 
generalization, we argue that the Eurosceptic attitudes exhibited by national publics are 
influenced by normative codes of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour brokered over time by 
key societal actors (e.g. politicians, the media, and the public).  In other words, the internal 
operations of political systems, media organizations, and public interactions intimately affect 
how these different actors perceive and discuss matters concerning European integration in 
their respective national spheres.  After grounding our conceptualization of Swedish and 
Danish political cultures in relevant secondary literature, we compare how the publics of the 
respective countries discuss the EU in the medium of online debate forums.  Our prediction is 
that variances in both the tone and content of Eurosceptic online posts can be explained in 
terms of differences in how the respective countries’ main societal actors approach European 
integration in relation to one another.   
Our focus on a comparative national approach stems from the idea that although 
Euroscepticism is a transnational European phenomenon, opposition to the EU is sensitive to, 
and situated within, national cultural contexts.  Moravcsik recognizes that the socio-cultural 
background of states shapes their policies towards the EU (1993: 474), and the relationship 
between European states and the idea of integration is contingent upon historically developed 
ties (Bellier and Wilson: 2000).  Furthermore, McMahon (2013) argues that transnational 
geographies built on cultural and historical interactions affect European integration and 
opposition to it, with northern Euroscepticism as a case-in-point demonstration. Recent 
research on Euroscepticism has advocated analyzing the role of national level actors in 
influencing public opinion about the EU, thereby conceptualizing the EU as a supranational 
extension of domestic politics (Hooghe and Marks 2005: 420).  Previous work thus supports 
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the notion that social, cultural, and political components at the national level are integral to a 
thorough understanding of Euroscepticism.  We propose framing this national dimension in 
terms of political culture since it holistically incorporates how key societal actors shape 
national level discourses and practices.  In the next section we will provide a brief overview of 
‘political culture’ before providing our own nuanced interpretation of the concept.   
Political culture – a brief overview 
As the name implies, the concept of ‘political culture’ stems from the idea that a “very 
obvious” and “fundamental relationship” between politics and culture exists (Welch 2013: 
204).  The seemingly intuitive nature of the concept has afforded political culture the status of 
general currency in the social sciences, but, rather paradoxically, the term has been taken to be 
something so intuitive and self-evident that its construal into multiple academic disciplines has 
relegated the term to a buzzword lacking a coherent and widely accepted definition (Formisano 
2001: 394).   
First appearing in Almond and Verba’s seminal work The Civic Cultures, political culture was 
defined as “the specifically political orientations – attitudes, toward the political system and its 
various parts, and the attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” (Almond and Verba 
1963: 13).  Situated in a time when both history and the political sciences lauded culture’s 
explanatory power, the idea of a causal link between culture and politics sparked a number of 
spin-off approaches to comparatively test if individual orientations are influenced by the 
political systems in which they are situated.  Although the spin-off approaches were 
commendable in their strivings to further develop a theory of political culture that is 
empirically testable, ultimately political culture became a victim of disciplinary divisions.  The 
“fissiparous multiplication” of sub-disciplines and schools of thought researching political 
culture “provides for decreasing incentive and opportunity for mutual communication” (Welch 
2013: 211).  The result is a widely construed concept that, while still considered to bear 
scientific weight, lacks cohesiveness and application across disciplines.   
Lacking a unified theoretical and methodological front, the concept of ‘political culture’ has 
been open to criticism since its beginnings.  In the 1970’s the dominant method of political 
culture research was using survey data to quantitatively measure the ‘attitudes, values, and 
orientations’ proposed by Almond and Verba’s original formulation.  A number of criticisms, 
most notably by Pye (1972: 292), were launched against the ability to “subjectively quantify 
subjective dispositions” (Formisano 2001: 400).  Furthermore, the rising popularity of rational 
choice theory criticized the idea that cultural norms can be influential in individual decision-
making, and Marxist sympathizers pointed out political culture’s lack of focus on class position 
and institutional coercion (ibid).   
 
While during the latter half of the 20th century most scholars abandoned political culture 
studies to focus on rational choice theory or follow an interpretivist vein, the concept saw a 
renaissance in the 1980’s and 1990’s with the reconceptualization of culture as process – not a 
static explanatory variable.  Still, political culture faces the same criticisms, which Riesinger 




“to define the term [!], to disentangle subcultures from a society’s overall political 
culture . . . to theorize how political culture interacts with institutions and other 
attributes of a polity to produce political outcomes…[and to solve problems related to] 
individual-level orientations, their measurements, and connection to the collective.” 
(Riesinger 1995: 347) 
 
To summarize, the numerous disciplines and sub-disciplines in which political culture has been 
applied can explain the variances in the literature about conceptualizations of political culture. 
Nevertheless, the endurance of political culture as a concept despite continued criticism is a 
testament to its presumed validity in the social sciences.  We consider the latter to be a reason, 
not an impediment, to continue exploring how political culture can be defined and tested.  In 
the next section we offer an explanation for why political culture has been misconstrued, as 
well as present our own nuanced conceptualization of the term.  
Our definition of political culture 
We consider the ambiguity surrounding political culture to stem not from the assumption that 
politics and culture are related; rather, we hold that the multiplicity of approaches employing 
political culture have failed in thoroughly explaining how culture is understood in relation to 
politics.  While most approaches to culture denote the same idea – i.e., a human interaction – 
the differing connotations and implications of what culture means lends itself to ambiguity 
(Ersson and Lane 2005: 24).  In studies employing political culture, more often than not the 
author does not explicitly define his or her conceptualization of culture, leading the reader to 
deduce from context how the author relates culture to explaining political decisions and 
attitudes.  As a result, approaches to political culture are often incongruous with one another, 
limiting progress in the advancement of the concept and formulation of methodologies to test it.  
In order to define political culture, we must first relay how we understand culture before 
relating its role to politics.   
Following Weeden (2005: 714), we see culture as the result of ongoing processes of meaning-
making, defined as the translation of individuals’ interpretations of their material realities 
(political and socio-economic) into their actions. Embedded in the process of meaning-making 
is a normative system of cultural codes that define acceptable and unacceptable behavior, 
through which an individual uses as a frame of reference before acting. An individual’s 
affirmation or denial of acting in accordance with these normative codes can be construed as 
attaching a certain degree of meaning or ‘significance’ to that code. In other words, if an 
individual acts in accordance with a given prevailing social norm, he grants meaning to its 
existence and promulgates its validity for the rest of society.  If he acts against the code, he has 
granted meaning to another way of acting that can be affirmed or denied by other members of 
society. Rather paradoxically, through processes of meaning-making, cultural norms are both 
are a driver and product of this socially constructed process.  That is to say, the affirmation or 
denial of certain cultural codes shapes the future norms through which an individual reflects in 
later deliberations.  Certainly social norms change over time, but this requires the active denial 
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of the prevailing social codes, either through bottom-up popular movements or top-down 
political decisions.    
With this conceptualization of culture in mind, we define political culture as a system of 
socially constructed codes, brokered over time between individuals and the institutions forming 
the fabric of their society, that govern acceptable and unacceptable social behavior.  To further 
develop this definition, we wish to highlight the following main properties of how we 
understand political culture: as a system, as socially constructed, and as relational.  
Conceptualizing political culture as a system necessitates taking into account both the cultural 
component of society (i.e. human interaction) as well as allowing for the preferences or 
‘orientations’ of individuals.  While preferences and ‘orientations’ are rather synonymous, we 
hold the latter to be an individual’s construal of the cultural codes that govern appropriate and 
inappropriate behavior.  Preferences, on the other hand, are strictly what an individual prefers 
in light of self-interest, which may or may not overlap with culturally embedded orientations. 
Orientations may conflict with an individual’s preferences, and in choosing to act in accordance 
with or against the prevailing cultural codes of a normative system individuals generate a 
meaning-making process that either reaffirms or alters the normativity of those codes.   
However, it is important to note that although preferences and orientations may conflict, they 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive since “individual preferences continuously affect the 
normative order while the norms themselves are one of the influences that shape preferences” 
(Wilson 2000: 264).   
To understand political culture in terms of a system as we have defined it implies that this 
system is the socially constructed product of the interactions between individuals in a political 
system and the institutions comprising that political system over time.  We strongly contend 
that one cannot analyze the normative system of cultural codes in a political culture without 
looking at how the system was brokered between citizens and the institutions to which they 
have granted legitimacy through voting power (at least pertaining to democratic systems).  In 
1968, before the concept of political culture was spread thin by the fissions of disciplinarity, 
Pye wrote that “a political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political 
system and the life histories of the members of that system, and thus is rooted equally in public 
events and private experiences” (Pye 1968: 218).   
The socially constructed property of the nation-state links micro-level individual orientations 
and those of the macro-level political system, such that political culture is both “popularity’s 
expression in the political arena” as well as the normative force that “gives meaning to politics 
by justifying material, cultural, social, and political institutions” (Fryklund 2013: 271, our 
emphasis).  Macro-level institutions cannot be extrapolated as perfect representation of micro-
level orientations, but this is a natural by-product of the social contract and development of the 
nation-state.  Therefore, political culture can be perceived as a brokering between individuals 
and the institutions that construct the political system in which they live.   
Political culture is therefore relational between individuals and the institutions that form their 
society – that is to say, political culture cannot be reduced to individuals or societies singly 
(Wilson 2000: 247).   Rather, political culture is the product of a dialectical relationship 
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between individuals and institutions, a relationship guided by the notion that individuals form 
political systems that, in turn, influence individuals. Political culture is thus both a static and 
dynamic construct.  Political culture is static in terms of the idea that there exists some ‘stable’ 
system of values, norms, and orientations that can be construed and disseminated as cultural 
codes; however, this system is constantly and dynamically being challenged, affirmed, and/or 
changed through individual and political decisions (i.e. processes of meaning-making) in 
responses to social and economic circumstances.   
Most political culture studies, in our view, have placed too much emphasis on culture as 
coherent and stable, which has been criticized as indefensible empirically.  Our approach 
focuses on the dynamism and inherently unstable relationship in processes of meaning-making. 
We seek to analyse not the stability of cultural systems but rather the contradictions and 
ambiguities in this dialectical system in order for us to explain changes in the political order. 
The comparative analysis of political cultures in this study is aimed at expounding differences, 
not similarities, between the Swedish and Danish publics.  
Subcultures and Political Communication Culture 
 One of the criticisms lobbied against political culture is the idea that individual orientations 
cannot be extrapolated to the national-level, and ‘national’ political culture is too large a 
measure for study (Pappi:1986 cited in Pfetsch: 2004, 348).  From an empirical standpoint, it is 
not ideal to try and aggregate these sets of relationships to a national-scale. The popularity in 
describing a ‘national’ political culture is not on account of the nation as the best level for 
analysis; rather, it is because the negotiations between citizens and the institutions they 
legitimize has historically been nationally-bound within the development of the modern nation.  
The norms structuring individual orientations and governing acceptable behavior have been 
brokered within national boundaries, and therefore the ‘national’ focus of political culture is a 
contextual, not intrinsic, property to the concept. Verba suggests that the units of analysis 
should be kept smaller than the national aggregate (Verba 1980: 406) in order to more carefully 
pinpoint the value systems of what has generally been referred to as ‘subculture.’ By studying 
the specific relationships between different sets of influential actors in a political system, 
certain inferences can be drawn about how the orientations of individuals situated within the 
same political system are structured.  
Political culture cannot be treated as a monolithic, internally cohesive and stable entity. 
National political cultures can be more readily viewed as umbrellas for multiple and 
overlapping subcultures, which do not always fit harmoniously with each other (Wuthnow and 
Witten 1998: 62).  These subcultures are often country-specific and need to be identified as 
relevant and influential in the construction and reproduction of the social codes governing 
political relations.  While certain subcultures such as interest groups may be unique to a 
country on account of its historical development, many subcultures may overlap across 
countries and thus be ripe for cross-country comparison.    
Each subculture has its own modus operandi, as well as certain method of interaction with other 
subcultures.  For example, a media outlet of a given country has a certain normative 
constellation influencing how the journalists operate internally on a day-to-day basis, but the 
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way in which the same media outlet interacts with politicians (e.g. through the media’s 
portrayal of political messages) also has its own normative constellation of behavior.  The 
media can be considered as a stand-alone subculture, but its interaction with other influential 
actors forms another ‘second-level’ subculture between the media and the subculture with 
which it interacts. The overall political culture of a nation is a sort of meta-narrative drawn 
from the analysis of the norms and orientations evident in the interactions of how subcultures 
operate internally, as well as their relationship with other subcultures under the same political 
culture umbrella.   
Since our interest in the present paper is to investigate the Eurosceptic positions expressed in 
Danish and Swedish online forums, we propose focusing on the political communication 
culture of the two countries. Political communication encompasses all exchanges of 
information that can affect politics in a given society, and can include a very wide range of 
actors, from political parties and politicians to media, interest groups and NGOs. The most 
prominent actor in the political communication is the public, defined as the citizens, the voters, 
and the audience depending on its role in a particular situation. Citizens may protest in a street 
demonstration, voters may affect politics on election days, and audiences can engage with each 
other on online platforms (Pfetsch and Esser 2012: 26). Besides the public, the two other 
principal actors involved in political communication are the politicians and the media, whose 
relationship comprises a country’s political communication culture, i.e.: 
“[T]he empirically observable orientations of actors in the system of production of 
political messages toward specific objects of political communication, which determine 
the manner in which political actors and media actors communicate in relation to their 
common political public” (Pfetsch 2004: 348).   
While the focal point of political communication culture is the normative interactions between 
politicians and the media, the public indirectly influences political communication culture 
through their consumption of media and their democratic voting power.  Ultimately the public, 
with its own set (and sub-sets) of normative codes, forms the fulcrum sanctioning the actions of 
the politicians and the media.   The norms governing the interactions of the three actors 
constitute a country’s political communication culture, which for the purposes of this study 
serve as a proxy for the overall political culture since “political communication culture is an 
essential component of the political culture of a country” (Pfetsch 2004: 346). 
Interestingly, advancements in Internet technology have opened up new computer mediated 
communicative spaces where citizens can interact with one another anonymously and with a 
decreased reliance upon politicians and the media for information. This opens up the existence 
of public-to-public interaction that is relatively unexplored, wherein individuals can shape the 
opinions of others and potentially affect the preferences and orientations of not only other 
citizens but also political communication in general.  While individuals are certainly not cut off 
from political or media influences, online communicative spaces allow for an unfiltered public 
dialogue among citizens that was not previously possible.  We contend that through coding of 
these cyber spaces, normative constellations within the public-public subculture can be 
expounded. Furthermore, when the online discussions of Swedes and Danes are viewed 
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comparatively against differences in their respective nations’ political communication cultures, 
we expect that variations in the online dialogues on Europe can be explained by variations in 
the respective countries’ political communication cultures, as well as the citizens’ response to 
it.     
Before proceeding to the data, though, the following subsections will discuss Euroscepticism in 
general and, more specifically, how we predict Denmark and Sweden’s political 
communication culture will affect online discourses about Euroscepticism.  We position our 
expectations for the Swedish and Danish tone and content online based on what we expect their 
normative codes to be. 
What is Euroscepticism? Why does it exist? 
We follow Hooghe and Mark’s (2007:120) understanding of Euroscepticism as “encompassing 
a range of critical positions on European integration, as well as outright opposition” to “its 
policies, its institutions, or its principles.” The EU is not a one-dimensional political institution 
at which criticism can be uniformly directed; rather, the EU is a multi-dimensional construct 
that simultaneously functions as an international regime facilitating economic exchange, a 
supranational polity exerting political authority over its citizens, and a key player in a system of 
multi-level governance interacting with national politics (Hooghe and Marks 2005: 436).  The 
diversity of the EU, and the consequent diversity of criticisms directed towards either its 
mission or its structure, has led to a disparate field of academic literature attempting to grapple 
with the complexity of reasons stimulating Eurosceptic attitudes.  Historically, the most 
consistent polarity explored in the literature has been whether pragmatic or affective reasons, 
sometimes referred to respectively as the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ factors of Euroscepticism (Van 
Klingeren et al 2013). 
Initially, researchers approached the analysis of EU public opinion within the context of trade 
theory, where the EU is viewed as an economic regime and theorized in terms of a “calculus of 
economic costs and benefits” (Hooghe and Marks 2007: 120).  The general consensus of these 
early Euroscepticism studies was that poor economic performance (either at the national or the 
individual level) leads to higher dissatisfaction of the EU and the European integration project 
in general (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998). In addition to these ‘hard’, economic 
factors are ‘soft’ factors, those that deal with how social identities and the psychology of group 
membership (e.g. national identification and shared values) affect how one perceives the EU 
and European integration.  The social identity theories examining ‘soft’ factors of 
Euroscepticism tend to contextualize the EU as a supranational polity overarching territorial 
boundaries, and instead of economic factors, less quantifiable issues such as political trust and 
affective ties.    
‘Soft’ factors have been shown to be more influential in the construction of Eurosceptic 
attitudes than previously thought (McLaren 2002: 551, Klingeren et al 2013), but researchers 
still lack a consensus about the mechanisms that connect these ‘softer’ factors to negative 
attitudes about integration. For example, the literature supports the notion that public trust in 
national political institutions is relevant to how the public thinks about the EU; however, the 
precise role of how national political institutions relate to the construction of EU opinions is 
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unclear.  Some researchers have found that high levels of trust in national institutions translates 
into high levels of trust for the EU (Anderson, 1998; Loveless and Rohrschneider, 2011), but 
other studies demonstrate the opposite: that levels of trust in national governments and 
parliaments lead, through a substitution mechanism, to high levels of trust in Brussels 
(Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000; Sanders et al., 2012).  
The ‘hard’/’soft’ dichotomy, while useful when approaching the EU as either as an economic 
regime or a supranational polity singly, becomes troublesome when discussing the EU as multi-
dimensional. Traditionally in the literature, ‘soft’ factors have been pitted against ‘hard’ factors 
as pertaining to distinct, mutually exclusive conceptualizations of the EU (Hooghe and Marks 
2005: 420), but increasingly researchers are acknowledging that a relationship between the two 
is one of interconnectedness rather than mutual exclusivity (Dahlgren 2009: 84). A case-in-
point example is the Euroscepticism typically associated with the extreme left, whose 
Eurosceptic sentiments are steeped in pragmatism: i.e. the economic ramifications of the EU’s 
neoliberal agenda, and its consequent undermining effects on national welfare systems (Hooghe 
et al., 2002; Marks and Wilson, 2000).  On the surface, the extreme left seems to mobilize anti-
EU sentiments based on ‘hard’ economic rationale; however, the left’s propensity towards 
isolation from the EU as an encroaching international polity is in itself a sort of ‘soft’ 
paradoxical nationalism, albeit along civic rather than cultural lines (Halikiopoulou 2012: 509).   
The economic crisis provided ample conditions to research the role of economic factors in 
rousing Eurosceptic attitudes: e.g. decayed living standards, high unemployment, and loss of 
welfare access.  While some concluded that simply ‘confusion’ is the defining characteristic of 
the post-crisis attitudes toward the EU (Ross, 2008), others found that ‘hard’ factors – coupled 
with an increasing emphasis on ‘soft’ factors – were both crucial in understanding 
Euroscepticism:  
“The crisis has not brought economics back in as the most important source of 
Euroscepticism during the turbulent period of 2007–10. Rather, it has not only confirmed, 
but indeed exacerbated, the post-1992 trends, according to which national identity and 
political institutions play an increasingly important role in explaining public 
Euroscepticism” (Serricchio, Tsakatika and Quaglia 2012: 61). 
To summarize, while ‘soft’ factors have not been deemed important than ‘hard’, utilitarian, 
ones in justifying a Eurosceptic stance, affective factors have remained constant as one of the 
most important causes of anti-EU attitudes (van Klingeren, Boomgaarden and De Vreese, 
2013).  
Cue theory  
A crucial drawback to the analysis of Euroscepticism through a ‘hard’/’soft’ lens is the lack of 
emphasis placed on the agency of national level actors in influencing public opinion.  The EU 
is not a stand-alone economic regime or federal supranational polity; the EU is a multi-level 
governance structure comprised of various actors in the national arena.  ‘Cue theory,’ the most 
recent strand of Euroscepticism research, analyzes how national level actors – such as political 
parties, the media, or “intermediary institutions such as trade unions or churches” (Hooghe and 
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Marks 2009: 10) – construct the discourses that ultimately shape or ‘cue’ public opinion.  As 
opposed to an economic regime or supranational polity, cue theory conceptualizes the EU as a 
supranational extension of national politics, where public attitudes are “guided by domestic [i.e. 
national] ideology and domestic political organizations” (Hooghe and Marks 2005: 420).  
The valuable contribution of cue theory is its focus on localizing the scope of Euroscepticism 
research to the national arena, grounding its analysis in digestible domestic comparisons. Each 
European nation state has experienced its own unique development; the national level actors 
‘cueing’ public opinion in their respective arenas operate in differing political structures and 
adhere to normative, country-specific cultural codes.  Our study investigates the influence of 
normative cultural codes in structuring the orientations and preferences of both the national 
level actors ‘cueing’ public opinion, and conversely, the public’s reception of those cues.  
Although Euroscepticism is a pan-European phenomenon, particular expressions of 
Euroscepticism are situated within national contexts depending on the political communication 
culture of a given country.   
We find cue theory to be relevant for a discussion centered on political communication culture, 
since it specifically deals with the relationships between the national actors that we consider to 
be drivers and shapers of political communication. As aforementioned, in the context of 
Euroscepticism we consider political communication culture to be an appropriate proxy for 
political culture.  While political culture governs the acceptable behavior of how members of a 
nation state operate in general, political communication culture specifically deals with 
politicans’ and the medias’ methods and ability to influence the public, as well as the public’s 
range of alternatives when discussing or acting upon political or ideological preferences. 
Euroscepticism: who is a driver?   
The dynamic between ‘cue-ers’ and ‘cue-ees’ in EU public opinion research has been framed in 
termed of ‘mass-elite linkages’, asking whether national elites ‘cue’ public opinion from the 
top-down (De Vries and Edwards 2009) or the mass public influences party positions with their 
voting power from the bottom-up (Carubba 2001).  Although both approaches have been found 
to be correct, the focus on elite cueing – especially by political parties – has been much more 
thoroughly examined and supported than the impact of the mass public cueing political actors 
(McLaren and Guerra 2013: 359).   We find this imbalance in the research problematic, since 
previous research concerning ‘mass-elite linkages’ has identified a “reciprocal causation” and 
“conditional nature” between the cueing effects of national elites and the public (Steenbergen et 
al, 2007: 29). The main agents involved in political communication, (i.e. political parties, the 
media and the public) have each been found to play a role as drivers of anti-EU critiques.   
Political parties, the focus of the bulk of ‘cue theory’ studies, have been demonstrated to be a 
“decisive force in swaying popular opinion against Europe” on both ends of the political 
spectrum (De Vries and Edwards 2009: 9, 22), although extreme parties on either the left or 
right tend to be more negative about European integration than mainstream, centrist parties 
(Steenbergen et al., 2007; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010). A party’s position on the political 
spectrum does not correlate to a Eurosceptic position, as critique from both left and right can be 
directed against the EU. However, there is one issue that very often appears in association with 
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Eurosceptic reactions, namely immigration. Negative attitudes towards immigration highly 
correlate with party Euroscepticism (De Vreese and Tobiasen, 2007: 101–3; De Vreese and 
Boomgarden, 2005). 
The media has also been shown to “fuel public cynicism and scepticism” towards the EU (de 
Vreese, 2007: 271). Driving its own agenda with its own normativity and political profile, the 
media is able to take a stance on Europe through editorial texts and has the capacity to persuade 
elites and the public alike.  However, the media does not operate in isolation from the political 
structure in which it is situated or its primary audience: the public.  In their multinational study 
of editorials, Pfetsch, Adam and Eschner (2010) conclude that there is a large variation in the 
intensity and framing of news about Europe and that this variation depends on media type and, 
in particular, the national political context. Nevertheless, negative media coverage of the EU 
has been found to support increased Euroscepticism, although increased Euroscepticism does 
not necessarily affect the valence of media coverage) (van Klingeren 2014: 102).  The latter 
finding seems to support the notion that while the media has the potential to ‘cue’ to public, the 
public has little effect on ‘cueing’ the media.   
The European public is, either directly or indirectly, the essential focus of Euroscepticism 
studies, and we have identified two themes in the literature dealing with how public opinion 
against the EU is framed: intensity, and object of opposition. Hooghe and Marks’ broad but 
accurate definition of Eurosceptic has the advantage of capturing these two themes, which are 
integral to the construction of our methodology.  
The intensity of a Eurosceptic position refers to the degree of change desired vis-à-vis the 
status quo of the EU and has been developed to include a variety of nuances: critics vs. sceptics 
(Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008); Europragmatists, Eurosceptics and Eurorejects (Kopecký and 
Mudde, 2002); critical Europeans, Euro-sceptics and adamant Eurosceptics (Wessels, 2007); 
compromising, conditional and rejecting (Vasilopoulou, 2009); and alter- and anti-European 
(de Wilde, Michalidou and Trenz, 2014).  Ultimately, the vast nomenclature surrounding the 
nuances of Euroscepticism can be seen as attempts to refine Eurosceptic opinions into 
gradations of intensity. On the one hand, a Eurosceptic position can be completely against the 
European integration project and wish for its abolishment entirely. On the other hand, one 
might be critical only of certain aspects of the project and desire small changes to reform or 
improve the EU without abrogating it.   
Whereas intensity focuses on the degree of change desired in the EU, the object of a 
Eurosceptic position points to what aspect of the EU is specifically being critiqued.  Generally, 
the objects of critique can be divided into two main dimensions: principle and project.  Having 
principle as the object of critique refers to being against the very idea of European integration, 
whereas focusing on the project shows dissatisfaction towards with specific manifestations of 
the EU: its institutional set-up, its policies in various domains, or its consequences at the 
national and sub-national levels.  Others have referred to the dimension in terms of diffuse 
versus specific opposition (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002), and Wessels identifies three targets at 
which opposition is generally aimed: the authorities (EU bureaucrats and their corresponding 
partners at national and subnational levels of governance), the regime (EU’s institutions, the 
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values that found them and their ways of operation) and the community (other European 
citizens) (Wessels 2007: 289). 
2
 
The Cases of Sweden and Denmark 
In the following pages we will provide a brief overview of the literature delineating the main 
features of the Danish and Swedish political cultures, with a specific focus on political 
communication culture. Despite our initial expectation to find well-established pieces of 
academic work on the countries’ political cultures (in part due to the popularity of the concept), 
the literature on the topic is scarce and we were forced to proceed piecemeal, sketching an 
outline of the two political cultures from indirectly relevant and oft-disparate sources.  In 
building our conceptualizations, we paid particular attention to research relevant to Denmark 
and Sweden’s relationship to Europe and the European integration project, as well as studies 
offering insight into each country’s political communication culture.  
Generally speaking, Sweden and Denmark are considered to belong together in the Nordic or 
Scandinavian family, and thereby share “a common political culture, characterized by 
proportional representation, stable parliamentary democracy and a social democratic welfare 
state” (Demker, 2012, p. 239). The two countries’ historical development in the modern era has 
many similar features, from the economic and technological modernization of the late 19
th
 
century to the gradual democratization of the political system under the pressure of social 
movements.  Strong social welfare systems, inspired by a social democratic ideological bent, 
have been an enduring feature of the political life in the two countries for over one hundred 
years now. Other contemporary features shared by Sweden and Denmark are: both are small 
states in terms of population; both are constitutional monarchies; both are members of the 
European Union; and, at least until very recently, both experienced influx of labor migration 
beginning in the 1960’s. Perhaps most importantly, though, Sweden and Denmark, together 
with Norway, Finland and Iceland, share a perception of belonging together in something 
loosely defined as ‘Norden’, a primarily category between the nation and Europe3. 
Although Denmark and Sweden are grouped together as Nordic ‘brothers’ in European-wide 
comparative studies, if examined alongside one another a number of divergences between the 
countries becomes apparent. When viewed within the context of Euroscepticism, and cue 
theory in particular, inferences can be drawn as how Swedes and Danes will discuss the EU 
online.  Based on our own interpretative analysis of the disjointed literature surrounding Danish 
and Swedish political culture, we have created a matrix that disseminates our forecasted 
expectations as to how the publics will express Euroscepticism online along three main 
categories: Tone, Type, and Reason.  Each main category corresponds to our expected 
distinctions about how the political culture and, specifically, the political communication 
culture, afford variances in the intensity, object of opposition, and motive when expressing 
                                                          
2
 More recent work on the subject introduces the temporal arrow, saying that Euroscepticism can 
include opposition to the present state of affairs (either in principle or in practice) or the future of the 
EU (Vasilopoulou 2009; Boomgarden et al. 2011).   
3
 For more on the history of Norden and its relationship to Europe see Stråth (2010).  
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Eurosceptic opinions.   For the purpose of constructing a coherent argument we begin first with 
‘Reason’ before moving to ‘Tone’ and ‘Type’ categories, 
Reason 
In our matrix, ‘Reason’ corresponds to the motivation given for why one is skeptical or 
negative about the EU or European integration.  We distinguish whether one frames a 
Eurosceptic argument based primarily on ‘hard’ utilitarian grounds steeped in rational 
cost/benefit analysis or affective reasons where ‘soft’, identity factors take primacy.  For our 
empirical case study, we hypothesize that the Swedish online posts will be more utilitarian than 
those of the Danes, who we predict will put forth affective reasons when supporting their 
Eurosceptic positions.  We have drawn this conclusion based on a review of the academic 
literature on Danish and Swedish discourses of difference, which we consider to mark a critical 
divergence between the general political cultures of the two countries.  In addition, the cueing 
effectiveness of the countries’ respective Eurosceptic parties, as well as the media coverage of 
these parties within their corresponding national domains, points to a disparity between the 
political communication cultures of the two countries.  Consequently, the variances in the two 
political communication cultures lead us to predict that the Swedish Eurosceptics will be ‘cued’ 
by politicians to be utilitarian, whereas the Danish Eurosceptics will be ‘cued’ along an 
affective vein.   
We consider the most significant difference between Danish and Swedish political cultures is to 
be found in their conceptions of the self in relationship to the other – in other words, 
conceptions of ‘national identity.’  The two countries’ differing approaches to national identity 
are perhaps best enumerated contextually through a look at their respective immigration 
policies. Denmark’s immigration policy is characterized by a “closed exclusionary regime” 
underpinned by “discourses on national self-sufficiency”, whereas Sweden’s “open and 
inclusive” policies are “carried by international moralism and accountability” (Hedetoft 2010: 
121).  Simply put, Denmark’s immigration policy is characteristic of assimilationism, whereas 
Sweden has been lauded as “the flagship of multiculturalism” (Borevi, 2012). The two 
countries’ differing policy approaches towards migrants can be considered the political 
manifestation of contrasting cultural attitudes towards migration, with the Danes 
characteristically exclusive of migrants and the Swedes generally inclusive.  Danes build 
measures to protect themselves from the perceived invasion of strangers (see for example the 
Danish opt-outs from the Asylum and Migration policy of the EU), and therefore we predict 
that their Eurosceptic arguments will be framed according to social identity-based factors – 
what we dub ‘Affective’ reasons.  We expect Swedes, on the other hand, to hold Eurosceptic 
positions based on rational “Utilitarian’ arguments on account of their inclusive multicultural 
policy connected to concept of folkhemmet [‘the people’s home’], a Swedish social-democratic 
ideal perpetuated in public consciousness that everyone in Sweden should be guaranteed basic 
economic security (Fryklund 2013: 271).    
In Denmark, national sovereignty has been a constant explanation for the repeated ‘No’ votes 
by the Danes on EU referenda. Fears of weakened national control led to the first ‘No’ in 1992 
on the Maastrich Treaty and were rekindled in the public consultation on joining the euro (also 
14 
 
ending in a ‘No’ vote). Discussing the Euro-referendum, Downs (2001: 223) argues that the 
government’s strategy of proposing the deal only on the basis of economic arguments failed, in 
comparison with the opposition’s portrayal of the euro as “sacrificing national identity.” Thus it 
appears that utilitarian arguments are weaker in the Danish context and affective reasons are 
arguably more convincing.   
Concerning the Swedish case, Tjernström notes that “in Swedish politics and media, the 
monetary costs and benefits of EU membership overrides ideas of any intrinsic values of 
cooperation” (Tjernström 2008: 183).  Moreover, an earlier study concluded that in general, the 
discussion about the pros and cons of European integration has been dominated by economic 
considerations, underlining Swedes’ utilitarian voting approach (Miles 2001: 305). In particular 
Swedes are concerned with the future of the welfare state and express scepticism in regards to 
the economic advantages of sharing and managing the common Euro currency.  While initially 
the Eurosceptic economic arguments in Sweden came from the extreme left
4
, their EU critique 
became less fervent with time.  While initially critical of the EU, the left and in particular what 
Raunio referred to as “hard-line Eurosceptics”, namely the Left and Green Parties (Raunio 
2007), turned officially in favour of Sweden’s continuous EU membership since the 2000s. 
Swedes are seemingly inclined to motivate their political choices based on utilitarian, rational, 
and factual arguments. 
Another factor supporting our expectation that Denmark’s political communication culture 
leans towards a more affective argumentation whereas the Swedish one tends to favour a 
rational approach is the varying degrees of success of their anti-immigration parties
5
. Since the 
anti-immigration parties of Sweden and Denmark are also the leading Eurosceptic parties of the 
two countries, we consider a cross-country comparison of their development within the context 
of national political communication culture a relevant point of analysis to support the building 
of our matrix. 
The rise of the Swedish Democrats (SD), a Swedish political party campaigning on an 
immigration-critical platform and Sweden’s self-proclaimed only anti-EU party6, from a fringe 
party in the 1990’s to member of the national parliament since 2010 and of the European 
parliament since 2014
7
, demonstrates a switch from left-to-right in Swedish anti-EU 
tendencies.  However, a closer look at SD’s rise in popularity suggests that the affective 
arguments employed by SD are not as effective as those utilized by their Danish counterpart, 
Dansk Folkepartiet (DF) – even though the political strategies and discourses of SD have been 
roughly equivalent to DF. Beginning in 1995, SD underwent a modernization campaign to 
purge extremism (Hellström and Nilsson 2010: 55) and increasingly shifted their rhetoric away 
from criticizing ethno-cultural difference towards emphasizing the utilitarian costs of 
                                                          
4
 Supporting Halikiopoulou’s (2012) study cited on page 9 here. 
5
 Explanations for the divergence of electoral success as well as in immigration policy are not just 
societal but also systemic (i.e. the structure of the party system) according to Green-Pedersen and 
Krogstrup (2008). 
6
 SD is “the party for EU-critical politics”, as per their party program (Sweden Democrats, 2014). 
7
 In the 2010 Swedish national election, SD passed the 4% threshold needed to enter the Riksdag with 
5.7%.  After the 2014 European elections, SD stood as Sweden’s fifth largest party with 9.67% of the 
vote (Val.se).  
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immigration.  While SD maintains an affective dimension in their self-categorization as a 
‘socially conservative party with a nationalist outlook’ and an open rejection of 
multiculturalism, their increased focus on the utilitarian dimension of immigration and 
decreased focus on classic xenophobic rhetoric can be interpreted as an attempt to ‘cue’ 
Swedish voters by appealing to their utilitarian leanings.  
In contrast to the Sweden Democrats, the Danish anti-immigation party Dansk Folkpartiet was 
formed in 1995 and had already reached the Danish Parliament in 1998 with 7.4% of the 
popular vote.  DF has seen its number of voters constantly increase, reaching the most 
successful result so far in the elections for the European Parliament of May 2014. With 26.7% 
of the votes (Danmarks Statistik, 2014), DF became the largest party in Denmark
8. DF’s 
communication approach has been characterized as being mostly carried by a “pathos” rhetoric, 
in contrast with the other Danish political parties and mainstream media, who employed 
“logos”, as per Pederson and Anderson’s 2011 study of Danish politicians’ statements in three 
dailies in 2009 (an EU election year). 
The fact that DF’s rhetoric has been embraced by mainstream public9 and that the party has 
become accepted as a ‘normal’ part of Danish politics suggests that their affective 
argumentation bore fruit. On the other hand, the fact that SD has been ostracized by the other 
Swedish political parties
10
 until they changed strategy and formulated themselves in more 
pragmatic terms supports the idea of the utilitarian Swedish voter.  
In Sweden, the media has historically portrayed SD in a negative manner, whereas the Danish 
media has discussed DF in a more neutral way; however, research suggests that over time this 
discrepancy seems to be narrowing.  A study comparing five Swedish and five Danish 
newspapers for the years 2004 and 2009 (EP election years) examined the image of the main 
proponents Euroscepticism: SD and DF.   The Swedish newspapers consistently portrayed SD 
in a very negative light in 2004 (over 70% of the articles), a proportion drastically reduced in 
2009 (28%), when SD was presented in either a fairly negative (29% of the articles) or 
balanced (43%) fashion (Hellström and Hervik, 2014, p. 457-458). In comparison, the five 
Danish newspapers examined for the same times reveal that in 2004 a great majority (59%) of 
the articles were balanced in their portrayal of the DF. In 2009, only 42% of the articles had a 
balanced tone, with the proportion increasing for those using a fairly negative (19%) or very 
negative (28%) way of describing the activities and positions of DF (Hellström and Hervik, 
2014, p. 457-458). 
Vallaste (2013) finds that the main broadsheet newspaper in Sweden, Dagens Nyheter, like its 
counterparts in Finland and Estonia, has a bias against Euroscepticism, which is presented in a 
negative way. Eurosceptic persons are also viewed with disdain; they are considered less 
                                                          
8
 This leading position will most likely be challenged in the national elections, but chances are that DF 
will still get a very significant amount of votes.  
9
 As seen for example in disappearance of humanistic nationalism in the Danish political debate about 
immigration, and instead a focus on orientalist nationalism, which polarizes an ‘us’ and ‘other’ category 
(Koefoed and Simonsen 2007: 316-17). 
10
 A number of SD leaders have claimed that other Swedish politicians at the local – but especially 
national level – refuse to communicate with SD politicians at government meetings (Bossetta 2012: 26). 
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informed, less rational and more fearful than pro-EU individuals. Eurosceptic arguments were 
not seriously debated in the editorials of these newspapers, but rather summarily dismissed. 
To summarize, on the basis of the above data we conclude that the political cultures of Sweden 
and Denmark vary, and are indeed contradictory, concerning conceptions of national identity. 
We consider the conflicting political communication cultures as proxies of an overall difference 
in Sweden and Denmark’s political cultures. Since we expect that those individuals expressing 
Eurosceptic opinions online will have been ‘cued’ by their country’s respective Eurosceptic 
parties, we expect Danes to give more affective reasons in their online posts than the Swedes.  
That is not to say that Swedes will not be affective in their reasoning, especially since SD 
incorporates national identity rhetoric alongside their utilitarian rejection of the costs associated 
with immigration.  However, on account of the traditionally utilitarian voting patterns of 
Swedes, coupled with their membership of a political culture largely built upon 
multiculturalism and the protection of the welfare state, we hypothesize that Swedes will be 
more inclined to present utilitarian reasons for Eurosceptic opinions than the Danes, who we 
suspect will support their Eurosceptic positions based on affective reasons.   
Tone 
We have divided the category ‘tone’ into three sub-types: moderate, negative, and radical.  
Tone refers to the rhetorical intensity of communication and is not directly related to the 
content of opposition. We built the expectations for our Tone category based on the general 
manner of reporting about the EU in Danish and Swedish media, which cannot be divorced 
from the way in which politicians elaborate on the subject. We first overview the data on media 
habits of Danes and Swedes as it emerges from the latest opinion poll on media and the 
Europeans (European Commission 2013a). We will then describe the image that Swedes have 
in Denmark and Danes in Sweden as it is revealed in the popular literature in support of our 
final expectations for the Tone of Eurosceptic online posts.  
In the Eurobarometer report “The Media Habits of Europeans” from 2013, Sweden and 
Denmark are placed very close to each other in terms of the size, intensity, and tone of 
European Union coverage.  For example, both Danes and Swedes are unhappy with the size of 
the EU coverage by their respective national media systems, with roughly a third of Danes and 
Swedes stating the EU is talked about “too little” by the national media (European 
Commission, 2013a, p. 50), and the publics of both countries generally think that their national 
media portrays the EU in an objective, unbiased fashion (ibid: 55).
11
 
Both Denmark and Sweden lack an intense national coverage of the EU activities (Lund 
Larsen, 2013; Pedersen and Andersen, 2011; Strömbäck and Nord, 2008; Vikalo, 2014). 
Previous comparative studies confirm that Danish media outlets, like their European 
counterparts, tend to talk about Europe only when something “big” happens (e.g. European 
                                                          
11
 The Danes were slightly more affirmative on this point. In response to whether the EU is presented 
objectively in national television, radio, press, and websites, the Danish result was: 62%, 62%, 58%, and 
56% respectively, and the Swedish result was: 55%, 53%, 48%, 35%.    
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election or European Council meetings) (De Vreese, 2002; Lund, 2002; Peter and De Vreese, 
2004; Boomagrden et al, 2010).  
The weak presence of the EU in the national news is combined with a rather neutral and factual 
reporting about the events or decisions in Brussels from both countries’ media. However, even 
if the language is overall objective, the way the news are framed is conflictual, with the nation 
pitched against the EU or with the EU most often as the cause of the conflict in Denmark (with 
the exception of those cases when national politicians “have won” in Brussels) (Tandrup and 
Sørensen 2008), and with the nation framed as weak in Sweden (Vikalo, 2014). 
Therefore, the two countries are very similar in terms of the treatment that news about the EU 
gets in national media. The common denominator between the two countries is low priority is 
given to Europe in relation to national news, the relative objective manner of talking about the 
EU, and a conflict framing that undermines the impression of neutrality in tone. Denmark or 
Sweden, however, have not been typified as Eurosceptic (De Wilde, Michalidou and Trenz, 
2013, p. 196), an idea suggesting that the media ‘strategies’ presented stem more from apathy 
than intentional ‘cueing’ strategies by journalists.  
The similar media coverage and framing about the EU in Denmark and Sweden means that in 
order to explain differences in the tone of online debates, we need to find more pointed 
differences between the two countries where media is still relevant. We have chosen to base our 
assumptions about Tone on two discursive arguments relating to political communication 
culture.  The first set of discourses regards how the political communication culture of one 
country is portrayed by the national media of the other. Secondly, we again focus on the 
Eurosceptic parties and argue that the discourse of the supporters ‘cued’ by those parties will 
fall in line with the rhetoric of the parties, who are situated within the context of their 
respective national political communication cultures.   
The first argument is based on mutual perceptions of the other’s national media. The Swedish 
media style is perceived in Denmark as overly ‘politically correct’, while the Danish media 
discourse is seen by the Swedes as ‘too extreme’ in its regard for freedom of expression that led 
to, most notoriously, the Mohammed Caricatures crisis at the expense of tolerance and respect 
for other cultures (Hedetoft, 2010, p. 121). The topic of Danish – Swedish differences has been 
taken up with fervour by journalists and writers on both sides of the Öresund Strait and marks a 
clear difference how the national media of one country views the political communication 
culture of the other. For example, Mikael Jalving, a Danish journalist, wrote a book entitled 
“Absolut Sverige: En rejse i tavshedens rige” [Absolut Sweden: A Voyage in the Kingdom of 
Silence] (2011) exploring the “silence” of the Swedes when it comes to country’s most pressing 
problems – a book reviewed with little acclaim by Swedish press. Jalving’s work was a reply to 
a Swedish journalist’s critical excursion into Danish politics and society, “Världens lyckligaste 
folk” [The Happiest People in the World] (2009), in which the author, Lena Sundström, took up 
the topics of xenophobia and the success of Danish People’s Party as reflective of worrying 
developments in the Danish society. 
Such exchanges are rather common in the media landscape of the two countries. Jalving has 
recently started a daily radio program running every day for 50 minutes during the month of 
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July 2014 where he invites Swedish voices condemned to silence because of the pressure of 
conformism and political correctness. The guests on the daily 55-minutes long show 
“Danmarks röst” (Denmark’s Voice, named after the famous Cold War radio station “The 
Voice of America”, sending pro-democracy programs into the Soviet territory) discuss topics 
considered by the host as taboo in Sweden: anti-feminism, immigration, or the hunt for wolves. 
Even in newspapers this kind of dialog across the border takes place. For example, the chief 
editors for the culture sections of one Danish and one Swedish newspaper (Berlingske 
tidningen and Sydsvenska dagbladet, respectively) exchanged six rounds of debate about the 
Danish and the Swedish ways of dealing with diversity in February 2014. The articles were 
published in the two respective languages at the same time and generated some wider 
reverberations in other media channels.  
Dahlerup (2013) sums up the major points of controversy between the two political 
communication cultures. The Danish journalists active in the debate accuse the Swedish media 
and public debates of being characterized by censorship and quieting down otherwise healthy 
debates on controversial topics such as immigration, diversity, and gender equality. The 
Swedish debaters accuse Danish journalists and politicians of racism, xenophobia and sexism 
and interpret Danish freedom of expression as a guise covering tendencies towards nationalism, 
exclusivism and inequality between immigrants and locals as well as men and women.  
Our second discursive argument relating Tone to the context of political communication culture 
is the role of the DF and SD in cueing public opinion. Although both Danish and Swedish 
media use a moderate tone in the reporting of EU news, we expect a more acute mobilization of 
sentiment on account of the cueing strategies of the two Eurosceptic parties.  Although we 
consider both DF and SD to relay their political messages in a radical tone, we expect the 
Danish public to be more radical than the Swedes online.  We derive this assumption from the 
relationship between Danish politicians and the media, where the latter acts as a transparent 
conduit for the former.  In Sweden, on the other hand, the political communication culture 
attempts to exclude SD from political discussions and media coverage, and thus we suggest that 
their initial radical rhetoric will not get through to the public effectively enough to translate into 
a high proportion of radical posts online.   
Type 
The last category of our matrix deals with the level of desired change of the EU and where this 
critique is directed. Are the Eurosceptics proposing to abolish the Union entirely (Anti-EU) or 
are they interested in its reform (Alter-EU)?  
The latest Eurobarometer poll of November 2013 reports that although we both Sweden and 
Denmark are more positive than the EU-28 when it comes to the future of the Union, the Danes 
were reported much higher optimism than the Swedes (75% in DK versus 59% in Sweden and 
51% the EU average). Moreover, both publics find that membership in the EU is a better option 
than to be outside the Union, again with Denmark polling higher than the Swedes (DK 74%, SE 
58%). According to an “openness index” compiled from measurements of individual mobility 
and contacts across Europe, the Danes are strongly European (45%), in the same category as 
the Swedes (41%) and way over the EU-28 average (only 14%).  
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The Danes and Swedes are both clearly against the formation of a European federation of 
states, with 73% of Danes 71% of the Swedes against the federal idea (the average across the 
EU membership is 45% in favour). An indirect measure of pro-federalist attitudes, the support 
for a currency union is met also by strong resistance in both Nordic states: 74% of the Swedes 
are against, as well as 65% of the Danes. 
The opinion data thus shows that both Danish and Swedish publics see the advantages of EU 
membership and are not interested in renouncing it, and have even developed affective 
connections with the idea of a European togetherness. On the other hand, neither of the two 
desires further tightening of ties with other EU member states nor the creation of a 
supranational federation. In comparison with the trust and the attachment to the national 
identity and institutions, commitment to Europe typically lower in both countries.  
The Eurobarometer results are in agreement with the scholarly literature on the subject. De 
Wilde, Michalidou and Trenz (2013) note, for example, that Sweden’s online media users 
evaluate positively the principle of European integration (p. 44) but are critical of the current 
institutional set-up of the Union (p. 47). The authors conclude that Sweden’s reputation as an 
Eurosceptic country is not supported by the evidence from online debates,  as it does not 
“display higher levels of negative evaluation of EU legitimacy… than less Eurosceptic 
countries” (p. 196).  
Sørensen’s study on variations in Euroscepticism in the UK and Denmark concludes that it is 
“difficult to sustain the general assumption that Denmark is a particularly Eurosceptic member 
state”, with the exception of the critique brought to the EU integration on sovereignty 
arguments (2008, p. 91). 
Eurobarometer data as well as scholarly research supports the idea that the mainstream public 
opinion in both Denmark and Sweden can be described, in our terms, as leaning towards an 
Alter-EU position, with Danes more willing to reform the EU than the Swedes, who would 
seem to prefer an exit from the Union.  However, because of the influence exerted over the 
forum users by the Eurosceptic parties DF and SD, and because of the polarization that is often 
encountered in online media, we expect an exacerbation of positions online. Posts on the 
Danish forum Jubii would be, we hypothesize, more Alter-EU, whereas posts on the Swedish 
Flashback would lean towards a comprehensive critique of the integration principle and a 
desire to exit the Union.  
Expectations 
By systematizing the data derived from our political communication culture analysis as it 
relates specifically to Euroscepticism, we have created a matrix that communicates our 
expectations for the Tone, Type, Reason of Eurosceptic discourses online by the Danish and 
Swedish public. The Tone of the debates refers to how an online post is phrased, and we 
ascribed three sub-types to the Tone category corresponding to increasing gradations of 
severity: Moderate, Negative, and Radical.  
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The second category we take into consideration is the Type of Euroscepticism expressed; in 
other words, how pointed the critique against the EU is. We consolidate several of the 
categories used by other scholars and distinguish between the sub-types Alter-EU and Anti-EU. 
The two sub-types, although more general than some other typologies in the Euroscepticism 
literature, are intended measure variation in the scope of the critique brought to the EU. Alter-
Europeans disagree with the a particular aspect of the EU, either in one of its principles or in 
structure, but are in favor of keeping some sort of European Union, albeit in a revised form.  
Anti-Europeans are staunchly opposed to the basic premise of the European project, namely 
integration, and are for the abolishment of the EU entirely.  
Reason, our third matrix category, posits that the reasons given in critique of the EU are either 
Utilitarian or Affective, approximately correlating to the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ factors of 
Euroscepticism often discussed in the literature. Utilitarian reasons highlight pragmatically 
derived Eurosceptic critiques inspired by cost/benefit logic typical of ‘hard’ factors.  Affective 
reasons are value-driven critiques aligning with the ‘soft’ factors of Euroscepticism, namely 
concerns over issues such as identity and culture (Van Klingeren et al 2013: 689).   
We have structured our matrix, presented below, by sifting through literature that does not 
specifically align to support the objectives set out in our study. However, by piecing together 
fragments we consider relevant from the academic literature, Eurobarometer surveys, and 
discourses of media and political parties in Sweden and Denmark, we consider our expectations 
grounded enough to formulate a viable coding scheme for our methodology.   Still, we 
emphasize that the three categories of our matrix are meant to be approximations, rather than 
honed projections, of empirical reality.   
 Denmark Sweden 
Tone Radical Negative 
Type Alter-EU Anti-EU  
Reason Affective Utilitarian 
 
Method and sources 
The method used to explore the variation of Tone, Type and Reason between Danish and 
Swedish online discussions on Euroscepticism is a computer-assisted systematic qualitative text 
analysis. The comparative research design takes two similar cases of political culture and aims 
to identify areas of inconsistency, which we expect to be explained concretely by differences in 
the two countries’ political communication cultures. 
Despite the growing popularity of the Internet as a place to pursue social science research 
(Herring 2010), online political discussion forums are among the less explored loci of virtual 
interaction. Most research dealing with such communication spaces focused on aspects 
pertaining to democracy and to the type of deliberation and dialogue that takes places among 
the users of online forums (see for example Albrecht 2006; about online deliberation on 
European issues see Simon 2010; Monnoyer-Smith and Talpin: 2010) Little work has been 
done on the expressions of Euroscepticism on these debate forums, and virtually no studies 
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have been conducted connecting political culture, Euroscepticism, and online debate forums in 
a Scandinavian context.   
While acknowledging the “messiness” of our source (Karpf 2012: 642), we find value precisely 
in the less structured, less moderated and largely anonymous components of online forums. 
Since political discussion online is influenced by the qualities of the medium within which it 
takes place, such discussions are defined by: 
“interactivity, which permits genuine dialogue between Internet users; the possibility of 
bridging physical distances between people, which in turn allows people to find both 
homogenous and heterogeneous groups; the potential for anonymity, which permits expressions 
without fear of recrimination; and reduced feelings of social presence in online discussions, 
which both increases the willingness to speak on political subjects, but also increases the 
chances for anti-social behavior, such as flaming” (Stromer-Galley and Wichowski 2011: 170).  
We selected two online platforms for discussion, one Danish (Jubii, formerly known as Din 
Debat) and one Swedish (Flashback). We are aware that the forum participants are not 
representative of the general composition of the population. Online discussion users tend to be 
male, middle-class, more educated than average (Albrecht 2006; Dahlgren 2012: 15). 
Moreover, the population of forum users is leaning more towards the SD and DF in comparison 
with the Swedish and Danish voters at large – for example, in a pre-election poll conducted 
among Flashback users in August 2010, the Swedish Democrats came as the most powerful 
party, with 46% of the registered users. Also in Denmark the online users cannot be considered 
too similar to the general population. Online polls conducted on Jubii’s web site reveal for 
example that 82% of its users were against a possible Danish adoption of the euro in 2011, and 
that 65% wanted to leave the EU in favor of a Nordic Union. However, one should not 
generalize without ground: in a 2007 poll about the desirability of EU membership for 
Denmark, a majority of Jubii’s users were in favor (72.8%). It can be thus concluded that the 
users of these online forums in both countries tend to be politically more to the right than the 
average voters in the two countries. This has a direct effect on the balance of power between 
the cueing actors: the political parties and politicians, as well as the media channels that 
position themselves to the right of the political spectrum have the ear of more Jubii and 
Flashback users than of the average Dane or Swede.  
From the outset we were made aware of the difference in output between the Swedish and the 
Danish internet forum participation. Whereas in Sweden Flashback is a well-established and 
well-known virtual meeting place where discussions from gardening and fashion to politics are 
taking place among 888 197 registered users (% of population), Jubii is a far less visited space 
with 173 120 registered users (as of date of writing, August 14, 2014). This variance can be 
speculatively attributed to the difference in political communication culture between the two 
cases. As it emerges from the literature on the subject, the main feature of the Swedish 
mainstream political communication is its tolerance bordering on conflict avoidance – what 
outsiders often perceive as an excessive care for political correctness. The Danish political 
communication is usually described as more open and direct, with freedom of expression as its 
defining trait. It is therefore to be expected that Danish mainstream media would offer room to 
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express even the more deviant views whereas the Swedish mainstream media would prohibit or 
censure the opinions not fitting with the dominant political culture. 
In order to identify those topics that dealt specifically with political subjects and with the EU in 
particular we followed largely the same procedure for both forums. We identified the thread 
specialized for political discussions and then looked within it for a sub-topic dealing with 
European politics. In the case of Jubii, the political aspects were to be found under the thread 
Culture & Society. All the 16 758 subjects are displayed without further categorization, so in 
order to locate those topics of EU relevance we performed a search for Europa/ Europeiske 
Unionen in the entire thread and then manually selected those subjects that were directly 
relevant. When this method yielded too few results, we performed yet another search for the 
entire thread and looked beyond the title of the subject at the content of the 769 575 answers. 
We included thus those threads whose answers counted most search results. In the end, the total 
number of examined posts was 1324, spread over seven conversations. 
The structure of Flashback is slightly different. There political discussions are grouped under 
the label Politics, thread that is subsequently divided in subcategories, including one called EU, 
with 916 subjects and a total of 32 223 posts. In the selection of the most relevant subjects we 
looked for the total number of posts per thread, the total number of users who contributed, and 
the year of last posting (with the ambition to select the more recent discussions). The total 
number of examined posts was 461, divided among five different conversations.  Because of 
the different ways of organizing the threads and subjects and because of the higher number of 
users, the relevant discussions on Flashback were more easily identified, giving us a smaller 
sample but more germane to the subject of interest than in the case of Jubii, where the 
organization was looser and the need for combing for relevant information more acute. 
Our aim was to perform a text analysis that paid attention to both content and form, to both 
political orientations and political sentiment. The political opinions were measured along two 
coordinated, Reason and Type, while political sentiment was captured by our Tone variable. 
We anticipated that online forums, as the terrain of informal politics, will be full of informal 
language, intentional and non-intentional misspellings, the use of slang, and even of terms of 
abuse. Moreover, we were aware that online political discussions tended to deliver “highly 
polarized discourses” (Malouf and Mullen, 2008), and that also in this respect we were not 
dealing with a representative reflection of the society at large.
 
We filtered the resulting material so that only posts that could be categorized as Eurosceptic 
were coded. Pro-EU posts and posts that did not explicitly talk about the EU were not coded. 
On these Eurosceptic posts we applied a set of codes determined deductively, following the 
matrix of our expectations. After checking for coder reliability, we coded for Type, Tone and 
Reason, our three dimensions of comparison, each of these with its own variation parameters. 
Thus for Type we included three options: Anti-EU (if the post was in favor of a complete 
dismantling of the Union), Alter-EU (if the post criticized the current state of affairs but still 
identified benefits with the EU, possibly in a modified form) and Type inconclusive (when the 
post did not contain information about the target of EU criticism). For Tone we followed the 
standard dimensions of media analysis and divided into three styles: Moderate, Negative and 
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Radical, depending on the type words used (swear words, hyperboles), the punctuation 
(exclamation signs) and the editing (writing in all caps, bold, or italics). Reason was coded 
either Utilitarian or Affective, depending if the basis of EU criticism was factual and pragmatic 
or if it was based on values and/or identities. We included also a code for those posts where no 
reason was given. The unit of analysis for the coding was the phrase, except for tone, which 
was coded as defining an entire post. The same post could host both an affective and a 
utilitarian reason, for example a user on the Danish forum writes in the same post from May 
2014, in the context of the rejection of the idea of a Union: “I feel that more of a shared 
belonging with the Germans than with the Swedes” (affective reason), and just a couple of lines 
below “I am in favor of concrete partnerships and agreements among sovereign states” 
(utilitarian reason). 
A particular difficulty in coding for Type and Tone was dealing with humor, irony and 
sarcasm. In order to code as accurately as possible, we took into account the context of the post 
as well as the possible connections/replies with earlier contributions under the same subject. 
We did not code for visual elements such as emojis.  
A final note on the language: all posts on Flashback were in Swedish and all posts on Jubii 
were in Danish. The translations are ours. 
Results 
In total, we analyzed 1785 online forum posts: 1324 from the Danish forum Jubii and 461 from 
the Swedish forum Flashback.  The posts came from twelve forum threads, where seven were 
Danish and five were Swedish.  Three of the Danish threads were from 2014, and the other 
threads were from 2013, 2012, 2011 and 2007.  Out of the five Swedish threads, one came from 
2014, two from 2012, and one each from 2013 and 2010.  The final number of coded posts was 
134 from Jubii and 111 from Flashback.   
Our typology matrix, built from the secondary literature surrounding Euroscepticism and media 
studies in Denmark and Sweden, relates how we expect the political communication cultures of 
the two countries to influence the behavior of Danes and Swedes online. We forecasted that the 
Danes would be predominantly Alter-EU in Type, Affective in Reasoning, and Radical in 
Tone, while we expected the Swedish discourse to be Anti-EU in Type, Utilitarian in 
Reasoning, and Negative in Tone.  The results of our analysis are reproduced in the table 
below, given as percentages of sub-types within each of the three larger typologies: Type, 










 Anti-EU 34% 53% 
Type Alter-EU 28% 13% 
 Diffuse 38% 34% 
 
Reason 
Utilitarian 26% 32% 
Affective 47% 39% 
Not Given 27% 29% 
 
Tone 
Moderate 42% 28% 
Negative 45% 48% 
Radical 13% 24% 
 
Tone: The Dominant tone for Denmark is Negative (45%), closely followed by Moderate 
(42%). In Sweden, Negative tone also the largest sub-type (48%), with the Moderate 
significantly lower (28%).  In both Denmark and Sweden, Radical was the least dominant sub-
type, but Swedes (24%) tended to be more Radical than the Danes overall (13%).  
 
Type: Our findings show that for Type, the Swedes were proportionately more Anti-EU (53%) 
than the Danes (34%). Only 13% of the Swedish posts suggested an Alter-EU stance, compared 
to 28% in the Danish case.  The Indeterminate category, where neither an Anti-EU nor Alter-
EU position could be inferred from the post, was roughly equal in both cases although 
Indeterminate was the largest sub-type in Type only in Denmark.  
 
Reason: Concerning the Reason given for a Eurosceptic position, Affective arguments were the 
most prominent on both Jubii (47%) and Flashback (39%). The Swedes were slightly more 
Utilitarian than the Danes by 6%, and the number of posts that did not contain sufficient 
information to firmly code for an identity-based or pragmatic justification were roughly equal.   
 
To further explore the dynamics of our matrix, we cross-examined the relationship between 
coded segments at the intersection of the three categories.  We compared the number of coded 
instances where Tone overlapped with Type and Reason respectively, resulting in the two 
covariance tables below.  We did not include a table for the correlation between Reason and 
Type, however, since the two categories vary independently of one another.  
 
Table 2 breaks down the number of instances where Tone and Type converged in order to see if 





Moderate Negative Radical Moderate Negative Radical 
Type 
Anti-EU 11 23 11 13 23 21 
Alter-EU 22 14 22 5 8 1 
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Indeterminate 24 23 24 12 22 5 
 
Comparing the Tone and Type categories, we found that Anti-EU Danes were mostly Negative 
(23), whereas the Anti-EU Swedes were nearly equally Negative (23) and Radical (21) in their 
Tone.  For the Type Alter-EU, Danes were evenly divided at the two extremes of the Tone 
spectrum, and Alter-EU Swedes were mostly Negative, although overall there were few coded 
segments for the Swedish Alter-EU sub-type.The Danish posts were Indeterminate by a slight 
majority, whereas the in the Swedish case the Indeterminate category did not point to a clear 
Anti-EU bias.  
 
We wanted to verify these relationships against the Pearson correlation coefficient across the 
data series of individual forum threads.  While in some cases the Pearson coefficient supported 
our qualitatively systematized data, at times we found inconsistencies between the coefficient’s 
result and what our data suggested, especially in the Swedish case.  We attribute these 
discrepancies to the limited number of threads analyzed (i.e. there were not sufficient data sets 
to produce a statistically significant coefficient), as well as to the wide range of content 
discussed in the individual forum threads themselves.  
 
While in the Swedish case the Pearson coefficient did not find a significant correlation between 
Tone and Type, in the Danish case the coefficient reinforced our findings: Anti-EU Danes were 
likely to not have moderate forms of expression (-0.74); Anti-Eu Danes were rather likely 
(0.42) to use negative tones in their posts;  and Alter-EU Danes were most likely (0.70) to 





Moderate Negative Radical Moderate Negative Radical 
Reason 
Utilitarian 18 18 3 13 22 1 
Affective 29 29 11 8 17 19 
Not Given 15 19 6 10 16 7 
 
The second covariance table, Table 3, displays the instances of intersection between the sub-
types of Tone and Reason. The most significant finding from the Tone/Reason correlation was 
a clear tendency for the Swedes to be more slanted towards negativity than the Danes.  When 
an Affective argument was given, the Danes tended to be less Radical than the Swedes. When a 
Utilitarian reason was given, Danes were most often Moderate or Negative, whereas Swedes 
tended to be mostly negative. Finally, when a Reason was Not Given, Negative was the 
dominant tone in both the Danish and Swedish cases, although the Danes still maintained a 
higher number of moderate posts (15) to the Swedes (10).  
 
The Pearson coefficient in this case seems to only partially support our findings in Table 
3.  The Pearson coefficient suggested that Danish Affectives are most likely to be moderate in 
tone (0.72), even though we coded an equal number of Moderate and Negative Affective 
posts.  The Pearson coefficient also predicted that Danish Utilitarians would be most likely 




In our analysis, we will analyze each of the three categories individually, as well as look at the 





We expected that the Danish Eurosceptics would present Affective arguments.  The scholarly 
literature highlights the importance of national identity to the Danish political culture, with the 
Danish policies of immigration and integration characterized by assimilationism (Hedetoft 
2010).  More specifically, the political communication culture of Denmark is characterized by 
freedom of expression, which allows for a wide range of opinions to be discussed openly.  The 
media, although generally presenting news about the EU in a pragmatic manner, acts as a 
transparent conduit relaying the affective rhetoric almost exclusively associated with DF in a 
largely unfiltered manner.  Moreover, the DF’s normalization into the Danish political system 
affords the party a generous pulpit for advocating their political agenda to the public.  The 
normative acceptability of national identity as the basis for making political arguments in 
Denmark, coupled with the significant presence of DF’s rhetoric in the media and political 
arena, suggests that the Danish public would be effectively cued along affective tropes.  
 
The empirical material we examined confirms this expectation.  We found that on Jubii, Danish 
Eurosceptics echoed the affective rhetoric associated with DF, arguably demonstrating DF’s 
effectiveness as a ‘cue-er’ of Eurosceptic opinions.  National sovereignty, immigration, and 
democratic deficit were recurring themes in the content of the Danish Eurosceptic posts. 
 
Our expectation that the Swedes would offer more utilitarian arguments in support of their 
Euroscepetic opinions was only partially supported.  Although Affective reasons were the 
highest percentage (39%) given among Swedish Eurosceptics, the the frequency of utilitarian 
arguments is almost as high (32%).  One explanation to support this finding is connected to 
political culture.  As opposed to Denmark’s focus on assimilation, the political culture in 
Sweden leans towards multiculturalism, inclusion, and a concern for the future of the welfare 
state.  Whereas multiculturalism and inclusion are typically supported by affective 
justifications, the Swedes’ strong concern for the welfare state - enshrined in the concept of 
folkhemmet - suggests that utilitarian arguments would also be influential in their critique of 
the EU. 
 
Another possible explanation deals specifically with Swedish political communication culture, 
characterized in terms of a political correctness, where opinions deviating from the mainstream 
normative codes are stifled by the actions of the media and politicians.  The ability for the 
Sweden Democrats to ‘cue’ is hindered since their affective national identity rhetoric is not 
often reproduced by mainstream media outlets or addressed by the Swedish mainstream 
political parties, a notion that affords a self-perception among SD politicians as marginalized in 
Swedish society (Bossetta 2012: 26).  Recent research has shown that those who feel 
marginalized, excluded, or consider the current established political parties as “insufficiently 
responsive” have been shown to express their frustrations in alternative exercises of democracy 
(Dahlgren 2012: 3). New media, such as online forums, have the potential to circumvent 
traditional political and media channels (Nilsson and Carlsson 2014: 2), translating to the 
Flashback forum as an outlet for the voices of those who feel their opinions are marginalized or 
excluded in mainstream avenues of expression, e.g. print and televised media.  The Swedish 
Eurosceptics expressing affective reasoning are more likely to be encountered in online forums 
than traditional media channels.  We consider the prominence of utilitarian arguments coded, in 
light of the fact that the Swedish left has shifted towards a pro-EU position (Raunio 2007), to 
be a reflection of SD’s modernization campaign, which focuses on the costs of immigration 
alongside traditional affective, nationalist rhetoric.  Additionally, Dahlgren has pointed out that 
frustrated citizens who turn to online mediums “are driven by both rational and affective 
27 
 
elements, with the latter seemingly on the ascent” (Dahlgren 2012: 9, our emphasis).  
 
We attribute the differences found in the reason given for Eurosceptic positions by Swedish and 
Danish online forum users to stem from variations in their respective countries’ political 
cultures’ conception of national identity, which is actualized in how the political 
communication cultures of the two countries address their respective anti-EU parties, namely 
SD and DF. However, the finding that affective reasons were the largest category in both cases 
supports the general trend in the literature on Euroscepticism that ‘soft,’ identity-based factors 
are influential in the formulation of critiques against the EU. Another common trend found in 
Jubii and Flashback is the tendency for users of new media to generate content opposite from 
what would be expected in traditional media channels - i.e. what one would expect by 
analyzing the prevailing political communication culture. New media, then, provides a space 
for the public to express opinions not sanctioned by the norms of political communication 
culture through a process of differentiation. Our assumption is supported by Groshek and 
Engelbert’s study (2012), which demonstrated that the leaders of populist parties in the 
Netherlands and the US acted in ways contrary to their prevailing political culture in their use 




For the Danish case, our expectations were not met as the largest category was Indeterminate 
and not Alter-EU.  We consider the findings relevant for two reasons.  First, the large 
Indeterminate category (38%) supports other findings in the literature of Euroscepticism that 
identify a large ‘diffuse’ category, defined as a “ambiguous and incomplete, under-specified, 
unclear” critique of the EU (De Wilde, Michalidou and Trenz, 2014 p. 9). De Wilde et al’s 
‘diffuse’ category roughly correlates to our Indeterminate category, whose size is significant 
because it may point to a lack of effective cueing by national media and politicians.  The 
Danes’ lack of satisfaction in the national media coverage of the EU, the weak coverage of EU 
related news by traditional Danish media sources, and the Danish politicians’ low prioritization 
of European issues, altogether may account for the large Indeterminate category.   
 
The second relevant finding in Type is that the coded posts reflected a higher proportion of 
Anti-EU posts to Alter-EU posts, a finding that can be partially explained historically.  The 
opinions of some online forum users may be inspired by previous political communication 
strategies, even if the party has since then adjusted its political message over time.  DF’s 
political rhetoric has shifted from demands of exiting the EU to a calls for reforming it, a party 
strategy demonstrated by, for example, DF’s declining in 2013 to enter a European Parliament 
alliance with the staunchly anti-EU French National Front and Dutch Party for Freedom. 
Instead, in 2014 DF joined the European Conservatives and Reformists, a party group in the 
European Parliament with a moderately Eurosceptic agenda that seeks to alter the direction of 
the EU without “destroy[ing] the organisation or undermine[ing] cooperation” (ECR 
website).  DF’s recent change in party position rhetoric towards the EU does not exclude the 
potential that the ‘cueing’ effects of its previous anti-EU rhetoric are still in place.  
 
Although in Sweden the Indeterminate category was also large, accounting for a third of the 
Type posts, the Anti-EU Type far outnumbered Alter-EU, confirming the expectations of our 
matrix.  As in the Danish case, we partially explain this finding historically.  Since their 
inception SD has consistently remained against European integration and the EU, a party 
position solidified by their joining of the European Parliament party group Europe of Freedom 
and Direct Democracy, whose charter outright “reject[s] the bureaucratisation of Europe and 
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the creation of a single centralised European superstate” (EFDD website).  SD’s consistent 
rejection of the EU would seem to reinforce their cueing effectiveness, translating to a high 
proportion of Anti-EU positions on Flashback if indeed SD followers are the predominant 
online forum participants.   Additionally, the high number of Anti-EU posts in Sweden supports 
the Eurobarometer survey data, where 59% of Swedes were shown to be positive about the 
future of the EU (compared to 75% in Denmark).  
 
In regards to both cases, another possible explanation for the higher proportion of Anti-EU to 
Alter-EU Types has to do with how individuals characteristically express themselves in online 
discussions. Online political discussions tend to generally be more polarized (Malouf and 
Mullen, 2008). One study found when participating in group debates online anonymously, 
individuals tended to exhibit “enhanced group cohesiveness” and “polarize their positions in 
the direction of group norms” in order to clearly identify with one side of the debate and 
distance themselves from the other (Lee: 2007, 399). In the context of our study, Lee’s finding 
suggests that online forums like Jubii and Flashback may “amplify the divisions between social 
groups holding different views”, driving users to ‘pick a side’ in discussions about Europe. We 
noticed a clear polarization between pro- and Anti-EU positions, and though we only coded for 
the latter, the number of Anti-EU posts may have been driven up by this online phenomenon. 
Although the Indeterminate sub-type was large in both cases, this does not contradict a 




Our expectation that the Danish posts would be mostly Radical in tone was not confirmed as 
Radical was by far the lowest Tone category in the Danish case.  We expected DF to cue 
Radical tones among online users, and although the total proportion of Radical tones was low, 
the covariance tables identify a much higher number of instances of Radical tones when they 
intersected with the Type and Reason that we associated with DF: Alter-EU (22) to Anti-EU 
(11), and Affective (11) to Utilitarian (3). Therefore although the Radical posts were 
proportionately low, DF can still be attributed as having a ‘cueing’ effect on the online 
public.  However, we speculate that the small difference between Moderate and Negative types 
(3%) can be explained by the Danish media’s influence as a strong ‘cue-er’ through its 
reporting and framing of EU issues. In Denmark, the media has a tendency to “nationalize” EU 
news by, for example, citing national sources like politicians when events take place at the 
European level (Ørsten, 2004), and by-and-large the Danish politicians keep a distant, polite, 
and factual attitude towards EU matters by using rational, logical arguments (Pedersen and 
Andersen, 2011, p. 100-101, 122).  Although DF politicians are the exception on account of 
their emotional rhetoric, in general the political communication towards to the EU is moderate 
in tone, and the media’s transparent relay of the Danish politicians’ rhetoric may account for 
both the high number of Moderate posts as well as the low number of Radical posts.  The 
covariance table analyzing the relationship between Tone and Reason (Table 3) shows that 
regardless of the Reason given, Moderate tones far outnumbered Radical ones. 
 
Although we considered the Danish media’s portrayal of EU news to be factual in tone, the 
Danish media has been demonstrated to exhibit conflict framing of the EU, where the EU is 
portrayed as the cause of a conflict between Brussels and Denmark (Tandrup and Sørensen 
2008). Conflict framing decreases support for the EU regardless of how often EU news is 
presented (Vliegenthart et al, 2008: 415, 431), and in the Danish case we consider the media’s 
conflict framing to contribute to the high number of Negative posts.  To summarize, while 
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conflict framing may inspire negativity among the Danish public about the EU, the moderate 
tone in which the conflicts are relayed may also cue moderate critiques of the EU. 
 
Conflict framing of the EU, however, is not unique to Denmark; in Sweden the EU can be 
framed as a “political giant” posing a threat to the welfare state (Raunio, 2007: 205) before 
whom Sweden is portrayed as powerless (Vikalo 2014: 48-49).  Moreover, a review of the 
existing literature and Eurobarometer suggests that the Swedish national coverage of EU issues 
is approximately equivalent to that of Denmark in size, tone, and intensity.  According to this 
logic, the Danes and Swedes should exhibit similar patterns in the tone of their online posts. 
However, our findings show that although the tone of both Danish and Swedish posts is nearly 
equally negative, the Swedes are generally less Moderate and more Radical than the Danes.  As 
in the Danish case, we attribute media conflict framing to partially explain the high number of 
Negative posts.  In order to explain the high proportion of Radical posts in relation to the 
Danes, we propose that differences in the two countries’ political communication cultures drive 
Swedes frustrated with traditional media outlets to seek out alternative ways to express 
opinions deviant from the mainstream political communication norms. 
 
If we are correct in understanding the Swedish political communication culture as characterized 
by a hegemonic discourse of multiculturalism discussed in a politically correct way (Carlbom 
2003: 42, 54), in light of cue theory the Swedish discourse online should mimic the political 
communication culture and be Moderate in tone with a Utilitarian leaning, since the Swedish 
discussion about the pros and cons of European integration has been dominated by economic 
considerations (Miles 2001: 305).  Contrary to following the norms of the Swedish political 
communication culture, Swedes predominantly cited Affective Reasons that Covariance table 2 
shows were more likely to be Radical (19) in Tone than Moderate (8).    
 
We expected that the Swedish posts would be largely Negative, since SD’s rhetoric is radical 
but is stifled by the moderate Swedish political communication culture.  While our expectation 
is confirmed, the high proportion of Radical posts in relation to the Danes suggests SD’s cues 
are prevalent among the users of Flashback, a notion strongly supported by the Covariation 
tables.  The Radical, Anti-EU rhetoric deployed by SD is seemingly mimicked by Flashback 
users, since we found 21 instances of Radical/Anti-EU intersection compared to only 1 
Radical/Alter-EU instance.  Moreover, the other Covariance table shows 19 instances where 
Radical Tone and Affective Reasons intersect, versus only 1 intersection of Radical Tone and 
Utilitarian Reason, suggesting that SD’s Affective rhetoric is also taken home by Swedish 
online posters.  The Negative/Utilitarian intersection jumps to 22 instances, suggesting that 
SD’s modernization campaign towards less Affective, Radical arguments and more Utilitarian, 
politically mainstream (i.e. Moderate) arguments cues the online posters to be likewise 
Negative in Tone and Utilitarian in Reason.  If the Flashback users followed the cues of 
traditional media sources in Sweden, we could expect a large Moderate/Utilitarian intersection, 




The above findings motivate the question: Why is it that the Danish online users are largely in 
line with the Danish political communication culture, while the Swedish online users seemingly 
rebel against theirs?  The answer, we posit, lies in the variation of the countries’ political 
communication cultures’ handling of their respective Eurosceptic parties.  The Danish political 
system and media system transparently incorporated DF into the public debate, likely since 
DF’s affectively-derived political message played to the heartstrings of the Danish public, who 
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have been a crucial actor in constructing a general political culture steeped in nationalism and 
assimilationism.  DF and their message, undoubtedly a shock to the Danish society at first, was 
over time normalized through processes of meaning-making by the Danish society at 
large.  The political system, media, and public each granted legitimacy to DF through political 
cooperation, adequate and transparent media coverage, and not least voting power by the 
Danish people.  Danish society was confronted with a new phenomenon and sanctioned DF’s 
message as acceptable by renegotiating the prevailing normative constellation through 
processes of meaning-making.  
 
In Sweden, on the other hand, SD’s affective rhetoric, a near carbon copy from their successful 
DF neighbors across the Øresund, bucked the prevailing political culture centered upon a 
multiculturalist ideology and was (and is) deemed unacceptable by politicians and the media, 
who together worked to demonize and marginalize SD members and their message (Bossetta 
2012: 15-17).  While the party is still marginilized in Swedish society, currently some members 
of the Swedish public are attempting to change the prevailing normative constellation through 
granting significance to SD’s message through voting.   
 
The findings of our data suggest that Swedes, through a process of differentiation from the 
prevailing political culture, are consciously turning to alternative, ‘new’ media outlets to debate 
issues unsanctioned by the political culture and not sufficiently portrayed by the political 
communication culture.  Computer mediated communication like online forums allows for the 
anonymity to sidestep cultural stigmatization, promoting a lower sense of social risk (Curtis 
1997) and, furthermore, enhancing a subjective sense of civic empowerment (Dahglren 2012: 
5) through the bypassing traditional media on account of online media’s low barriers for 
participation (Ignatow and Schuett 2011).  
 
New media “enable marginalized groups to make their voices heard in public contexts in a 
more profound way than before” (Nilsson and Carlsson 2014: 2), and we have argued that the 
Swedish political communication culture, as a proxy manifestation of the overall national 
political culture, stifles the opinions of its dissenters, who in turn seek out alternative modes of 
expression.  Political communication culture has different effects in Denmark and Sweden, 
since the contrast between online and traditional media discourses is more acutely measured in 
the case of Sweden on account of its censorship-oriented political communication culture.  The 
number of users, amount of traffic, and active participation on Flashback far outnumber that of 
Jubii or any Danish discussion forum, precisely since Danes do not feel the need to seek out 
alternative media sources to the same degree as Swedes do.  Whereas Swedes feel the need to 
differentiate themselves from the mainstream media and political discussion via the cloak of 
online anonymity, Danes do not exhibit the necessity since what Swedes would consider 
‘extremist rhetoric’ is already firmly incorporated and established in the Danish public 
discourse.   
 
The process of differentiation between traditional media outlets and new media (i.e. online 
forums) enacted by Swedish online users was integral to our explanation of the differences in 
the political communication culture of our two cases.  The supporting secondary literature used 
in the construction of our expectation matrix, aside from being scarce, was not tailored to test 
for differentiation.  Therefore, we suggest as an avenue for further research the need to develop 
a more articulated understanding of how the process of differentiation works, what the social 
and structural conditions under which it occurs are, as well as exploring the potential effects.  
We consider these avenues relevant to further developing the research surrounding, new media 
studies, political communication culture, and European public opinion.   
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Furthermore, while our study offers explanations based on cue theory, we have not tested the 
exact cueing mechanisms between politicians and the media, as well as between traditional 
media versus new media discourses.  We wish to also emphasize there was lack of pre-existing 
literature that hindered our ability to make more sophisticated judgments about the link 
between politicians, media, and the public in relation to the specific context of our study.   
 
Contributing to the lack of pre-existing literature specifically geared to a new media, 
Eurosceptic, and Nordic context, we confirmed our initial expectation hypothesizing that 
varieties in the form and content of public opinion can be explained by differences in political 
cultures.  While some researchers have stated that “public opinion on integration does not 
follow national, cultural, or geographic patterns,” we contend that through cross-country 
comparisons of the relationship among actors in political communication cultures, certain 
normative constellations can be identified indicative of the overall political culture 
(Vasiliopoulou 2013: 154).  Uncovering these normative constellations through the discourse 
and practices of influential actors within a political system should serve valuable a more 
nuanced understanding of Euroscepticism in contemporary EU politics.  
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